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“They Have Left Us in a Hole”
Democratisation and Political Power in a West African Village
Lars Rudebeck
 
Decentralisation and democratisation
1 The conceptual focus of this article is on democratisation. More concretely, its thematical
focus is on power, livelihoods and cultural meaning, which were the interdisciplinary
catchwords of the conference on decentralisation where an early version was presented in
May 2004 (Rudebeck 2004).1 The confluence of concepts and themes becomes logical and
possible,  as the overlap is  considerable between the concepts of  democratisation and
decentralisation. But, the two are far from identical. All decentralisation is certainly not
democratic,  and  some  democratisation  may  well  involve  centralisation  of  democratic
power in order to overcome local non-democratic power. Still, as said, the two are close.
2 We are concerned primarily with ‘substantial democracy’ and its links to ‘development’.2
The latter is conceptualised as a process of structural change whereby the gap is bridged
between existing  possibilities  and  general  needs  recognised  as  legitimate  in  a  given
society.  In  the  analytical  language  employed  here,  ‘substantial  democracy’  is  a  two-
dimensional  concept  aiming  to  integrate  constitutional  minimalistically  defined
democracy  with  a  notion  of  political  equality  in  actual  practice.  ‘Substantial
democratisation’, thus, is about political power becoming more equally/less unequally
distributed between citizens in a process where constitutional rules and actual practice
support each other. This is to say that more people than before begin to take charge as
citizens, sharing in decision-making on issues of common concern at various levels of
society, including the local level. The more of this, the more ‘substantial democracy’.
3 In  this  perspective,  substantial  democratisation  and development  are  linked  to  each
other,  at  all  levels,  including the local  level.3The following case study of  a  village in
Northern Guinea-Bissau provides a mainly negative illustration of  the linkage,  in the
sense that non-development stands out as linked to non-substantial democratisation. At
the end, however,  the possibility of a positive linkage is also suggested. First,  a brief
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background is given on overall democratisation and development in the specific country
where the case is situated.4
 
Brief background on democratisation and
development in Guinea-Bissau
4 Guinea-Bissau  is  a  West-African  country,  located  between  Senegal  in  the  north  and
Guinea-Conakry in the south and east,  living largely off agriculture and international
assistance. Its surface covers 36,125 square kilometres and the population is a bit over 1.5
million. It is divided into nine administrative regions.
5 Like many other countries in Africa and the world, Guinea-Bissau has been going through
a process of democratisation since around 1990. This process is shaky and vulnerable for
being limited to the constitutional aspects of democracy at the expense of decentralised
citizen sovereignty or autonomy in a substantial  sense.  Constitutionally and election-
wise, this democratisation is nevertheless real.
6 Guinea-Bissau  became  a  juridically  sovereign  state  in  1974,  after  eleven  years  of
decolonisation  war  against  Portugal.  The  autocratic  single-party  system  was  legally
abolished in 1991, and democratic parliamentary and presidential elections were held in
1994.  The ruling party since independence and former liberation movement,  PAIGC (
Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde), managed to win both elections and
remained in power.  Still,  a  political  multi-party system began to function,  and some
economic and civic progress began to take place. 
7 The last few years of the 1990s turned violent, however. Although the regime had been
democratically  legal  since  1994,  it  was  hardly  legitimate  within  its  own  society.  A
destructive civil  and regional war erupted in June 1998,  breaking the peace that had
lasted  since  1974  (Rudebeck  2001).  In  spite  of  being  supported  by  several  thousand
neighbouring country soldiers sent in mainly by Senegal but also by Guinea-Conakry, the
president João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, legendary fighter in the independence war turned
autocratic ruler, was forced to abdicate in May 1999. He had by then been president of the
country without interruption since 1980. His humiliating defeat marked the end of the
civil war.
8 Under  the  leadership  of  a  transitional  government,  Guinea-Bissau  returned  to
constitutional  democracy by way of  general  elections in November 1999 and January
2000. The opposition became the largest party in parliament and ousted PAIGC from the
government.  The presidential  election was won by the populist  opposition candidate
Kumba Yalá who scored 69 per cent of the national vote in the second round, against the
PAIGC candidate Malam Bacai Sanhá, interim president under the preceding transitional
period. Kumba Yalá was installed as new president for a five-year period in February
2000, supported in parliament by his party PRS.
9 Because  of  its  flagrant  inability  to  deal  with  the  country’s  developmental  problems,
Kumba Yalá’s regime was deposed by way of a bloodless military putsch on 14 September
2003 – gradually and somewhat reluctantly accepted by the ‘international community’ as
inevitable under the circumstances.5 A transitional regime was set up, and after a period
of  quite  peaceful  constitutional  transition,  parliamentary  elections  were  held on  28
March 2004,  resulting in the return to parliamentary majority power of  PAIGC,  with
Kumba Yalá’s party PRS (Partido da Renovação Social) in the second place. The election of a
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new president was delayed but finally took place in two rounds, on 19 June and 24 July
2005.  It  resulted,  paradoxically,  in the return to presidential  power of the very same
‘Nino’  Vieira  who in  1999  had been chased  into  political  asylum in  Portugal by  the
rebellious forces of his own army and by popular revolt. In the second round of the 2005
presidential election, ‘Nino’ defeated Malam Bacai Sanhá, candidate for a second time of
‘Nino’s’ earlier own party PAIGC, by a very narrow margin. The victory was juridically
contested by the loser and by the ruling party that accused Vieira of having cheated. In a
heated and paralysed political atmosphere, João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira was nevertheless
reinstated as President of the Republic on 1 October 2005.
10 Before, during and after the 2003-2005 interlude, governments continued to move in and
out of office. Strong dissatisfaction among the military, who often do not receive their
pay, is an important factor fostering political instability. Furthermore, the weakness and
consequent vulnerability of state institutions in Guinea-Bissau is currently turning the
country into a favourite place of transit for South American drug-trafficking to Europe
(UN  2008).  Large  amounts  of  Colombian  cocaine  are  re-loaded  in  Guinea-Bissau  for
further transport to European markets.
11 True enough, democratic institutions are in place, but civic and human rights are far
from guaranteed and the level of life of the people is deteriorating in rural as well as
urban areas. Power in society seems linked more closely to the possession of arms and
illicit  drug money than to popular support.  Thus,  the gap between state and society
appears as wide as ever and perhaps even widening, in spite of constitutional democracy.
12 On 16 November 2008, parliamentary elections were held again in Guinea-Bissau. Initial
reports were that election-day had passed off in peaceful and orderly fashion, resulting in
a convincing two-thirds majority for PAIGC (Lusa 16-21.2008). At first glance, this kind of
outcome might have seemed to forebode a measure of political stability. But less than one
week after the election, during the early hours of the night of 23 November 2008, the
President of the Republic barely survived an armed attack on his life mounted at his
residence by a group of nine soldiers from his own navy (Lusa, 23-26.2008).
13 The following months were marked by fear and threats of violence between the various
military and political factions. Finally, on 2 March 2009, before sunrise, President João
Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira was murdered in his home by a group of soldiers, only hours after
the death of the chief of the army, General Tagmé Na Waié, in a bomb attack.6 No serious
investigation, let alone trial by court of any suspects, has taken place so far.7
14 Under  pressure  from  ‘the  international  community’  in  various  shapes  (the  United
Nations, the organisation of West-African states, the organisation of Portuguese-speaking
nations, the European Union, Portugal, and others), Guinea-Bissau did after the initial
shock begin to prepare for the regular election of a new president. The campaign was
partly  violent.  One  presidential  candidate  and  one  other  leading  politician  were
murdered by soldiers in early June 2009 (Lusa,  5-8.6.2009), and others, such as former
Prime Minister Francisco Fadul, brutally harassed. Still, presidential elections were held
in two rounds on 28 June and 26 July 2009, resulting in the end in the reversal of the
January 2000 result. The second round was held between the two of the original eleven
candidates who had done best in the first round, none reaching 50 per cent. This time the
PAIGC candidate Malam Bacai Sanhá did defeat his opponent Kumba Yalá by getting 63
per  cent  of  the  votes  (Lusa,  29.7.2009).  A  great  number  of  observers  testified  to  the
peacefulness and fairness of the election process as such. A more telling fact, however, is
probably that on both election days as many as about 40 per cent of the registered voters
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simply did not turn out to vote (Lusa,  2.7.2009 and 30.7.2009).  This is a much higher
abstention rate than in previous elections in Guinea-Bissau, with for instance 25 per cent
of registered voters abstaining in the parliamentary elections of 2004 and 12 and 21 per
cent  respectively  in  the  first  and  second  rounds  of  the  2005  presidential  elections
(Rudebeck 2009).
15 All through the period of democratisation now described, welfare conditions for ordinary
people have been stagnating or worsening, regardless of some GDP-growth in the nineties
as well as more recently in 2004-2007, due to good cashew harvests (World Bank 2008). In
1997, before the eruption of civil war, Guinea-Bissau had occupied place 168 among 174 in
the UNDP’s Human Development Index ranking (Human Development Report 1999 :137).
Ten years later, after seven years of democratic restauration, the equivalent ranking was
175 out of 177, thus even worse. This means, in the concrete, that in 2007 average life
expectancy at birth was estimated to be 46 years (45 in 1997) ; adult literacy 45 per cent
(34  in  1997);  school  attendance  37  per  cent  (36  in  1997) ;  while  average  per  capita
purchasing  power  was  estimated  to  be  one  sixth  of  the  average  for  all  ‘developing
countries’ (one fourth in 1997) (Human Development Report 2007/2008 :293).
16 At  the  same  time,  in  a  globalised  world  system,  the  country’s  dependence  upon
international aid continues to be extreme. This structural condition is not accurately
reflected in aid statistics, as flows of aid have been slower to materialise after 1999 than
before,  due to low credibility of  the regime in the eyes of  ‘international  community’
donors. Still, in 2005, official development aid received accounted for 26 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP), as compared with one per cent for all developing countries and 9
for the category labelled ‘least developed’ (Human Development Report 2007/2008 :293).
In a more qualitative sense,  aid dependence as a political  and ideological  constant is
distinctly reflected in the leadership’s recurring references to aid as a key solution to the
country’s problems.8 Vulnerability in the face of potential ‘earnings’ from drug trafficking
is the other side of the same coin. Substantial dependence for development upon the
democratically  organised  support  of  the  people  seems  far  away,  in  spite  of
constitutionally correct elections.
17 All of this, obviously, is in glaring contrast to hopes and expectations once raised by the
successful 1963-1974 struggle for liberation from colonialism.
 
A village study 
18 I  have  described  and analysed  the  transition  now summarised  in  several  books  and
articles which will  be drawn upon here (e.g. Rudebeck 1997, 2001, 2002b, 2008b). The
special feature of the present article is that it selectively highlights one aspect of this
work over the years by focusing upon the political repercussions in one particular village of
the  overall  democratisation  occurring  in  two  phases  in  Guinea-Bissau :  firstly,  the
introduction  of  democracy  by  way  of  multi-party  elections  in  1994 ;  and,  secondly,
democracy’s  fragile  re-birth  without  concurrent  development  since  1999-2000,  after
collapse in 1998.
19 As a result of multiparty elections generally, citizens at all levels of society are drawn into
the  democratisation  process,  if  in  no  other  way  than by  registration  as  voters.  The
practical preparations for elections and their implementation also activate many people
at the local level. Whether this is decentralisation of political power or not is a completely
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different matter. From the point of view of substantial democratisation the decisive point
is  whether  the  elections  do,  in  practice,  empower citizens  to  jointly  formulate  their
interests  and  wishes,  appoint  their  representatives  and  demand  accountability.  Or,
whether the principal significance of the elections is on the contrary to help the leaders
mobilise their supporters to legitimise and promote these same leaders’ own interests. In
this respect Guinea-Bissau is not alone in the world in inclining significantly more to the
latter than the former. But, in Guinea-Bissau as in other places, there are features of both.
These features are difficult to capture in quantitative terms and therefore the method of
using an illustrative case study can be of  great assistance.  Such a case study follows
below, taking what I like to call a diachronic perspective.
 
Kandjadja – a village among thousands
20 There are almost four thousand villages of varying size in Guinea-Bissau. I have had the
opportunity to follow one of them ever since 1976. We shall obtain our material from that
village. The village is called Kandjadja. It is a normal Guinean village, similar to thousands
and tens of thousands of other villages in rural Africa.9 I have described it many times
before (e.g. 1992, 1997, 2001, 2002 :b). The directly visible changes take place slowly, but
life and history do not stand still. With its thousand or so inhabitants Kandjadja is one of
the larger villages in Guinea-Bissau. It is the main village in an administrative section that
also includes twelve smaller villages spread out in the forest south of the river Farim,
which flows westwards towards the Atlantic sea.10 The whole section had somewhere
around 4,500 inhabitants in 1999 and thus perhaps close to 6,000 in 2009, although I have
no firm ground for judging population growth and out-migration against each other.11
The area is situated in the administrative sector of Mansabá, in the Oio region, in the
northern part of Guinea-Bissau. As the bird flies the distance is not more than twenty-five
kilometres north-west to the border with Senegal and its politically unsettled Casamance
province. From Kandjadja to the sleepy regional capital of Farim there is a bumpy road,
twenty kilometres long, through the forest in a north-easterly direction. Bissau is some
one hundred and ten kilometres to the south, including twelve initial kilometres of track
road eastwards through the forest, before reaching the main road between Farim and
Bissau. Cars make only rare apperances in the village.
21 The Muslim Mandinga people dominate in Kandjadja, but ethnicity-wise there are also
‘Animist’ Balanta and Muslim Fula in the section. The main village is entirely Mandinga
and thus its religion is Islam. The livelihood and economy of the people are based upon
agriculture in a wide sense of the term, pursued with simple techniques on the basis of
proven methods and, in addition, certain handicrafts. There is also some inflow of money
from villagers employed in various occuptions in Bissau or abroad. The amount of this is
unknown but hardly impressive.
22 In  recent  years  cashew nuts  have  been  the  most  important  source  of  cash  income.
Previously it was groundnuts. Sometimes an enterprising villager takes other products,
for example a sack of onions, all the way to the large Bandim market in Bissau. During the
civil  war  in  1998-99  the  area  around Kandjadja  was  not  directly  affected  by  acts  of
warfare. Nevertheless, the war and the ensuing crisis of subsistence and survival were
still felt harshly, not least through refugees coming from Bissau.12
23 Since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  the  population  has  been  left  to  itself,  as  far  as
development is concerned.13 In an interview made in 1986, a villager told me that “they
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(the state) have left us in a hole”. The same could just as well have been said at the time of
my visit in 2007. The forest road leading to the village was then in worse condition than it
had been in 1976, over thirty years earlier, at the time of my very first visit. The state-
employed nurse of the village had already left before 1981. The former state-owned store
passed into private ownership in 1986, as a result of the structural adjustment reforms
sweeping over  Africa  at  that  time in accordance with World Bank and International
Monetary Fund prescriptions.  Simple consumer goods are found in the store,  but the
purchasing power in the village is limited. The state school was closed in 1989, as the
government gave up its earlier ambitions in the field of public education. 
 
A paradox
24 Politics  in  Kandjadja  may  seem paradoxical.  The  village  and  the  whole  area  are,  in
practice, untouched by government development policies. Literally nothing has reached
there in terms of benefits of national policy since the last school teacher left in 1989. Still,
for all that, PAIGC, and state power under PAIGC control, have always been able to count
on political support from the area where Kandjadja is located. Even in the multi-party
elections of 1994 – the first time ever that it was possible to vote against PAIGC – the
outcome was quite distinct.14
25 The general explanation provided locally for such paradoxical loyalty is that “this is an ‘
antiga zona libertada’/an old liberated area”, i.e. an area controlled by the PAIGC as early as
in the anti-colonial war between 1963 and 1974. This, today, is not a real explanation. It is
rather an indirect way of saying that the only political contacts existing between the
village (meaning: a few of the villagers) and the politicians in the capital go through
PAIGC.
26 This does not mean that people are satisfied with being “left in a hole”. The demand for
change (mudança) is as strong in Kandjadja as in other places in the country. Still, in 1994,
1999, 2000, 2004 and 2005, there were as we shall see more votes in the village cast for
PAIGC than for any of the other parties. Surely these outcomes may be traced largely to
links  established  during  the  war  of  liberation,  but  in  a  more  complex  manner  than
indicated by mere reference to political tradition.15
27 What happened in the area in the 1960s was that the PAIGC political structure was grafted
onto the local ‘traditional’ structure of extended families led by homens grandes (great
men, singular: homem grande) of varying standing, the most prominent of whom were also
recognised as leaders of villages and groups of villages. Through this structure, the area
of Kandjadja was largely mobilised on the side of PAIGC during the liberation war. During
the  immediate  post-war  years,  a  centralised  attempt  was  made  to  impose  a
‘revolutionary’ political structure with a party committee headed by an outsider sent in
by PAIGC to be in charge of the thirteen-village section of Kandjadja. With the resilience
of the traditional political structure and fading revolutionary ardour, this reverted quite
soon to a situation where the party/state simply maintained elementary political control
by relying on the loyalty of locally more or less influential people – ‘clients’ in relation to
regional and national levels. These persons in turn continued their co-existence with the
rest of the villagers as weak local ‘patrons’, with nothing concrete and ever less hope to
deliver in terms of development.16
28 We will soon return to more specific considerations of the Kandjadja paradox. Let us see
first how democratic elections worked in the village – after a devastating civil war on top
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of ordinary hardship. How did the local voters rate the political parties, in particular
their old favourite PAIGC? Did the promises made by the opposition seem to influence
them? How did the opposition’s leading presidential candidate, Kumba Yalá, fare, as the
voters were facing his image on the voting bulletin?
29 The following account is based on observations and interviews made in connection with
visits in May and December 1999, January 2000 and June 2007. To facilitate use of the
tables presented, they have all been assembled in a special section at the end of the text.
 
Democratic elections at village level
Parliamentary elections 1999 and 2004
30 As in several other places in the country, voting was delayed in Kandjadja on Sunday,
November 28, 1999.17 According to the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja,
the ballot box had arrived late. He was also the chairman of the section’s committee of
support for PAIGC and had kept precise notes. According to those notes, voting in the
village had started at 15.52 and, in agreement with the rules, had ended at 17.00. Since
this was too little time for everyone to have had a chance to vote, the voting had been
continued on Monday between 7.30 and 15.00.18
31 The reason for the delay in the arrival of the ballot box was most probably a nation-wide
threat of strike by the voting officials. Demands for an increase in pay made by certain
voting officials in the region had also caused problems the day before. It had therefore
been impossible to have the polling equipment in place in the village on Sunday morning.
Once the voting finally started, everything had proceeded very calmly and in orderly
fashion. According to the chairman of the section, this was only “to a certain extent” due
to civic awareness, since the political parties, in his view, had not taken the trouble to
make it clear to the people what they represented.19 Consequently the voters could not be
expected to really know what they were voting for. Still the citizens had taken everything
calmly  and  turned  out  strongly  to  vote,  but  apparently  without  great  expectations,
according to the section chairman.
32 Despite the fact that Kandjadja is situated off the beaten track in the forest, with very
poor communications, several political parties had visited the village to mobilise voters
before  election-day.  The  constituency  consisting  of  the  administrative  section  of
Mansabá, of which Kandjadja is a part, sends three members (deputies) to the People’s
National Assembly/parliament (Assembleia Nacional Popular/ANP). PAIGC’s candidates were
well known in the area and had as always promised to work for schools, health services
and road construction if  they were elected.  Even “Helder Vaz’s people” from ‘Bafatá’
(RGB/MB), the major former opposition party besides PRS, had visited the village, with
their promises of similar kind, as well as representatives of ‘Abubacar’ and ‘Bubacar’,
leaders respectively of the two small parties UNDP and LIPE. But besides Malam Bacai
Sanhá, PAIGC’s presidential candidate as well as interim President of the Republic, there
was only one other party leader and presidential candidate who had visited Kandjadja in
person during the election campaign before 28November 2008. This was Victor Mandinga
from AD. On the other hand Kumba Yalá’s party, PRS, had not shown up at all in the
village.  This  was generally  explained by the fact  that  Kumba Yalá  is  ‘Balanta’,  while
Kandjadja is ‘Mandinga’, which is true although not necessarily the whole explanation.
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33 The Kandjadja votes were counted on site under the close supervision of representatives
of the various parties. They were then taken to Mansabá and included in the votes for the
entire constituency. The results for the village, including Kandjadja-Balanta, are shown in
tables 1 and 2 at the end of the text. The first table compares the results of the 1999 and
2004 parliamentary elections in Kandjadja with the results for the entire country. As seen,
PAIGC was considerably stronger in the village than in the whole country. The difference
is greater in 1999 and in 2004 than it had been in 1994 (cf. note 10 above). This is true for
both years.
34 In 1999, immediately after the civil war, PAIGC was down to an all-time low of 15 per cent
at the national level. But in Kandjadja, 40 per cent of the 432 voters still voted PAIGC, in
spite of the defeat of the regime. Two specific explanations may be mentioned: 
• PAIGC’s candidates for Mansabá constituency’s three mandates in parliament were well-
known in the village.
• There was a direct personal link to the PAIGC presidential candidate Malam Bacai Sanhá’s
campaign office. 
35 The upward link consisted of the fact that a “son of the village”, who had been a teacher
in the village school in the 1980s, worked in 1999/2000 for Malam Bacai Sanhá’s wife in
PAIGC’s national campaign secretariat.
36 Furthermore, according to information from several sources that cannot be verified due
to election secrecy, all, or almost all votes cast in favour of the opposition presidential
candidate’s party, PRS, originated from Kandjadja-Balanta, a small neighbouring village,
administratively part of the main village and situated a couple of kilometres south of it.
In that village, all the inhabitants are Balanta. Thus they are not Muslims, they do eat
pork, and they like to drink palm wine. They also speak a completely different language
from the Mandinga language spoken in the main village. For all these reasons, and others
as well, they were tempted in 1999/2000 by the idea of asserting their cultural identity by
voting for PRS and its presidential candidate of Balanta ethnic origin. As opposed to the
nation-wide distribution of votes which was clearly influenced by a combination of non-
ethnic and ethnic factors differing from place to place and between the national and local
levels, we do seem here to have a very clear-cut example of ethnic voting. 
37 In the 2004 election, PAIGC generally did considerably better than in 1999, due to the
disastrous developmental and political performance of the regime that had been voted
into power in 1999 and 2000 but forced out through the 2003 putsch.  At the overall
national  level  this  recuperation of  PAIGC reached 31  per  cent,20 while  soaring to  an
overwhelming 67 per cent in Kandjadja. 
38 Table 2 shows in detail  how people actually voted in Kandjadja in the parliamentary
elections of 1999 and 2004. To facilitate comparison between the parties and years, the
table also gives percentages. 
39 The distribution of party sympathies in Kandjadja was different from the whole country,
not only with regard to PAIGC, but also in other ways. For example, UNDP, a new and very
small party at the national level (3 per cent of the total vote) was the second largest party
in Kandjadja in 1999 with 34 votes of the 432 votes cast – more than PRS and ‘Bafata’
(RGB) which both in that year outscored PAIGC at the national level.  I  was told that
UNDP’s success had been achieved by donating “a little medicine” and a new mat to the
mosque.
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40 It is notable in table 2, among other things, that as many as 11 of 13 national parties
competing in 1999, and 12 of 15 in 2004, actually succeeded in obtaining at least a few
votes even in an isolated village, such as Kandjadja. Those parties that failed to attract
any votes whatsoever in the two parliamentary elections in the village are very small
even  at  the  national  level.  One  of  them  is  FCG/SD,  the  party  of  the  only  female
presidential candidate, Antonieta Rosa Gomes, a lawyer who ran for president both in
1999–2000 and in 2005. Although her party scored zero in the village, Rosa Gomes still did
obtain one (1) of the 436 votes counted in the Kandjadja ballot box for president in the
first  round of  the  1999–2000  presidential  election.  We  can  only  speculate  about  the
driving forces behind that single, and singular,  vote for a woman as President of the
Republic.
41 It is, in any case, a significant observation about political democratisation in Kandjadja
that several citizens do seem to make use of their new-won right to cast a vote of their
own,  freely  and  secretly.  They  value  the  relative  civic  freedom  coming  with
democratisation. The same persons are sadly aware, though, that just spreading their
individual votes among a dozen political parties quite alien to the village will hardly bring
them any political influence, let alone power.21 The majority who did continue to vote for
PAIGC are also likely to have been disillusioned about the developmental outcome of their
support, while a few of them may still have been hoping for some personal benefit in
exchange for the vote delivered.
 
Presidential elections 1999/2000 and 2005
42 The  pattern  of  the  first  round  of  presidential  elections  is  similar  to  that  of the
parliamentary elections. On 28 November 1999, Kumba Yalá even received exactly the
same number of votes for president as his party PRS did in the parliamentary election
taking  place  simultaneously.  On  the  other  hand,  Malam  Bacai  Sanhá  received
considerably more votes than PAIGC – as many as 313, which corresponded to 72 per cent
of the total. This is much more than the 20 per cent he reached in the whole country. It is
also the same pattern as in 1994, in the first multi-party election ever to have been held
in independent Guinea-Bissau.22 Thus, the impression that Kandjadja in 1999 stuck to old
political  habits,  as  opposed  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  was  even  stronger  in  the
presidential than in the parliamentary election. Table 3 at the end gives further detail.
43 The ethnic, cultural factor that seems, according to my sources, to explain why most
voters from Kandjadja-Balanta voted for PRS and Kumba Yalá worked also in the opposite
direction. Only very few people voting in the main village cast their votes for the “Balanta
party” and for its leader in 1999–2000, according to the same sources.
44 A locally acute ethnic conflict, furthermore, influenced electoral behaviour in 1999/2000.
Robbing cattle  from neighbouring villages  is  a  traditional  test  of  manhood of  young
Balanta. In recent years several households in Kandjadja-Mandinga had suffered from
that cultural tradition – or criminal habit, as some would say. Things had even gone far
enough to cause some villagers to keep their cows locked up at night, for fear of cattle
thieves from the neighbouring village. Anger at this insecurity fostered negative feelings
for  PRS  and  scepticism  about  its  presidential  candidate  with  his  red  Balanta  cap.
Regardless of how much they agreed with him on the need for mudança/change, many
villagers feared a hidden ethnic agenda: ”Perhaps Kumba Yalá doesn’t like us ?”
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45 However, the conflicts over cattle and other material and cultural differences did not
keep the inhabitants of Kandjadja-Mandinga and Kandjadja-Balanta from having normal
social relations, which did, on the surface, appear uncomplicated and even friendly. For
instance,  people from the Balanta village do their shopping in the store in the main
village ;  they vote there ;  and until 1989 their children went to school there with the
Mandinga children.
46 The second rounds of the two presidential elections were straightforward. The choice was
either for or against : Kumba versus Malam in 2000 ; ‘Nino’ versus the same in 2005. The
inviting images of the candidates faced the voter from the ballot paper. In 1999 Kumba
Yalá was wearing a red Balanta cap and Bacai Sanhá the same type of patterned West
Africa knitted woollen cap as the historic leader of the anti-colonial liberation struggle,
Amílcar Cabral, used to wear in his time, before he was murdered by a member of his own
party in 1973. All that was required of the citizen was to step behind the screen and mark
her or his preferred candidate. Table 4 shows the outcomes for both years, in absolute as
well as relative terms. Table 5 adds the overall national comparison.
47 In statistical terms, as seen in the tables, the villagers’ support for the PAIGC candidate
Malam Bacai Sanhá was overwhelming in both years, around 90 per cent. This was very
much above his national level scores. But in fact, as we know, he lost his bid for the
presidency on both occasions : resoundingly in 1999 against the PRS candidate Kumba
Yalá and narrowly in 2005 against his former party comrade João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira.
In Kandjadja, though, PAIGC prevailed as ever. Even ‘Nino’ himself running as a non-
partisan ‘independent’ only got 33 votes in the village in 2005, as opposed to 328 eleven
years earlier, in 1994, when he was still  the leader of the country and of PAIGC (see note
18). 
 
Electoral democratisation in the village
48 We have seen that the voters of Kandjadja do make use of their freedom to vote in the
simple sense that they distribute their votes among many parties. But even after eleven
years of electoral democracy, a large majority continued to vote the old (single-) party
line in spite of being “left in a hole” as far as development is concerned. In this they are
considerably more ‘conservative’ than the average voter in the country. A number of
mutually reinforcing explanations have emerged from the foregoing presentation. Let us
summarise them :
• Kandjadja is an “old liberated area”, indicating a specific kind of historical tradition.
• There are few obvious differences between the parties’ programmes, platforms, ideas or
proposals, and therefore most voters have to rely on personal impressions and authoritative
persons in their local community.
• The people have very limited experience of any other ‘upward’ political channels than
PAIGC. 
• What matters in the PAIGC hierarchy is personal contacts, either directly or through local
‘patrons’, with PAIGC’s representatives at regional and national level, for instance in
parliament.
• There is an ethnic, cultural Mandinga versus Balanta factor working against PRS and Kumba
Yalá, reinforced at the time of the studied elections by acute problems with cattle thefts.
• There was at the time of the studied elections a direct link between the village and Malam
Bacai Sanhá by way of a respected “son of the village”.
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49 A special event had also impressed the villagers. On 10 January 2000, fairly late in the
evening, after dark, on the last Monday before election Sunday, Malam Bacai Sanhá, the
interim president  of  the  country and presidential  candidate  for  PAIGC had suddenly
arrived in Kandjadja. Driving in from the north, from the regional capital Farim, with his
campaign team, he had stopped for a public meeting in the middle of the village which
was dramatically illuminated by the headlights of his cars. He spoke to the villagers and
answered their questions for about half an hour. He had said, not surprisingly, among
other things, that if he was elected president, he would help the people of Kandjadja
section to get water, schools and health care. The message, I was told, had been received
with a  “certain amount of  trust”.  Malam Bacai  Sanhá had been wearing his  woollen
Amilcar Cabral cap, a symbol of ‘revolutionary’ legitimacy. A great deal of interest had
been aroused. Once the meeting was over, the national leader had continued his journey
southwards through the night to a larger town called Olossato. Darkness had returned to
the village, broken up only by small fires in front of the houses where people gathered to
discuss the singular event they had just experienced.
50 The chairman of  the  section emphasised  to  me that  this  was  the  first  time ever  in
Kandjadja’s history that a President of the Republic had visited the village. Kumba Yalá
for his part, he added, had never visited the village.
51 Thus, on second thoughts, perhaps the voting behaviour of the people of Kandjadja is not
so  difficult  to  understand.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  concrete  context  of  prevailing
conditions, of which the villagers are well aware, there may well be a type of disillusioned
rationality in it. If so, what are the implications for democratisation and democracy? And,
what are the implications for ‘civil society’?
 
Civil society
52 ‘Civil  society’  is  a  much-used  concept.  But  for  analytical  purposes,  it  is  diffuse  and
contested and therefore somewhat difficult to use. At a minimum, though, most of those
who do try to use the concept for analytical purposes agree that it refers to people acting
together in the social space existing in society between the state and the private sphere.
This obviously makes it relevant to democracy theory.23
53 At the overall level there are in principle two ways of increasing the opportunities for
citizens to assume responsibility in society, once single-party authoritarianism is done
away with.  One is  that  the  state  draws back,  leaving space  for  citizens  to  act  more
independently of  the state than before – in ‘civil  society’.  The other way is  that the
institutions  of  the  state  are  democratised and decentralised.  At  the  end of  1995 the
constitution of Guinea-Bissau was revised so as to allow for the establishment of elected
local assemblies (Rudebeck 1997 :44-46), but no further steps in that direction have been
taken since. There is no reason to assume that such assemblies would have any effects in
practice,  unless  provided  with  locally  controlled  financial  resources,  which  are
unavailable anyway.
54 The strategic issue for democracy is how the two approaches can supplement and support
each other. In its political practice so far, as illustrated by the case of Kandjadja, the
Guinean government has withdrawn far  in favour of  ‘civil  society’  at  the local  level,
except for the occasions of national elections. The question has been avoided or evaded,
how far such practice can be carried without large groups in the population ending up
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completely without access to common resources. Rural Africans are known to be patient
and resilient, but there may still be limits which cannot be transcended without breaking
the bonds of society.
 
‘Civil’ and ‘political’ society
55 A distinction is sometimes made between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. It is a question of
definition  for  political  and  other  social  scientists  whether,  for  instance,  political
opposition parties should be included in ‘civil’ or in ‘political’ society. The parliament is
part of the state, but the political parties also act in society at large, which could give
them a place in ‘civil’ society. Törnquist (1999 :50) suggests that ‘political society’ can be
seen as a link between purely ‘civil’ society and the state. Then, obviously, the opposition
parties will be crucial to that link.
56 Using the distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political society’, it is of particular interest in
our context to note that constitutional democratisation in the studied village affected the
two in very different ways. Democratisation did indeed result in the politicisation of the
villagers in the sense of getting them to participate actively and willingly in national
multi-party elections – largely in support of the old regime. Thus, ‘political’ society was
clearly  activated  and  also  democratised  in  the  constitutional,  minimalistically
conceptualised sense. What happened in ‘civil’ society is however more difficult to pin-
point. As we shall see, it was activated, too, and possibly also politicised, but not in a
democratic way and not in a way involving the decentralisation of political power.
 
‘Civil society’ at village level 
57 Before  1990,  one-party  rule  had  made  it  impossible  in  practice  for  voluntary
organisations to participate in development work in the rural areas of Guinea-Bissau,
unless they enjoyed the direct support of the state and the party PAIGC. But in 1990, the
first  year  of  democratisation,  something  very  new  happened  in  the  village.
Representatives  of  RADI  (Réseau  Africain  pour  le  Développement  Intégré)  began  to  visit
Kandjadja and to encourage the population to start programmes to develop local farming
based on their own traditional forms of organisation.24
58 Since then,  RADI  has  continued to  function in the region of  Oio  where Kandjadja  is
located.  Seventeen  kilometres  east  of  Kandjadja,  in  a  neighbouring  administrative
section, the organisation has put up a training centre for farmers in the forest near the
village of Djalicunda.
59 The centre is very ambitious. It is built with local materials, has its own source of fresh
water, and even computers working with the aid of solar cells. Local varieties of seeds are
cultivated  in  ways  that  take  the  environment  into  ecological  consideration.  Those
working  at  the  centre  in  Djalicunda are  locally  recruited  Guineans.  Various  training
courses are held there and the intention is that farmers in the area shall be inspired to
integrate modern farming techniques with the use of local seeds and due respect paid to
tradition and the environment.
60 According to a written report delivered in 1999,  the key concept of  RADI’s  theory is
“cooperation with the people” (RADI 1999a:6-725) :
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In Guinea-Bissau there is real potential to develop the rural sector, since land is still
available  for  further  cultivation,  and  there are  also  possibilities  to  intensify
cultivation, to diversify forestry, to extend local fishing and to increase the herds of
cattle. But it is important to note that a strategy to exploit all these possibilities
requires more than technical investments. It is necessary to make great efforts to
stimulate the interest of the rural population, to train, to organise and reorganise,
to improve the motivation of the technicians – all with the aim of getting those
involved in the rural areas to assume more responsibility and to strengthen the
position  of  women.  This  is  the  focus  of  RADI/Guinea-Bissau’s  support  for
development.
61 Another report described food support provided through RADI to 27 villages in the region
of Oio that received refugees during the civil war in 1998/99 (RADI 1999b :2, 4).
62 Although Mansabá sector was included in the food programme, Kandjadja, was not among
the 27 villages listed in the report. This is possibly due to the fact that support for RADI’s
work seemed to have declined in Kandjadja during the second half of the 1990s. It is clear
that opinions in the village on RADI are quite divided. Some villagers work actively with
the organisation and have succeeded in benefitting from it.  Others,  however,  express
dissatisfaction with RADI’s work and find that it focuses more on the organisation’s own
needs than on the needs of the local people (interviews,  December 1999 and January
2000).
63 These observations indicate that in 1999 and 2000 the kind of politicisation of civil society
in the village that the activities of this particular NGO had resulted in was more patron-
client  oriented  than  characterised  by  the  emergence  of  autonomous  grassroots
citizenship. Civil society had been activated, but not democratised.
64 The shortcomings and even the absence of  the state in developmental  activities  had
created a vacuum, as well as deep popular disenchantment in Kandjadja. This in turn had
opened up chances for an organisation such as RADI to strike a chord of strong response
within civil society. Thanks to democratisation, alternatives had become legal. Still, the
democratic vacuum had not been filled. 
 
A ‘civil society’ initiative
65 Visiting Kandjadja on 29 June 2007, I was surprised by a novelty. In fact, I was told that in
2006, deep and growing frustration over the lack of any elementary education whatsoever
in the village, except the Koranic school, had in the end caused a number of families to
join forces to set up a school of their own.
66 Ever since 1989, when the state run school was closed, only the Koranic school had been
available for the children of Kandjadja. The two finest houses in the village, the only ones
with outer walls of white plaster, are in fact the mosque where the Koranic school is held
and the house where the imam (the leader of the mosque) lives. 
67 As I was told, the idea of the new school is simple. In 2007, it had one teacher and a little
over one hundred pupils enrolled, divided between the first, second and third grades of
elementary school. The teacher had been hired from outside the village.26 The families
pay him 350 CFA francs (0.53 euro) per child and month. They also provide him with food
and a simple house. If some family is unable to pay, others help out.
68 In June 2009, my only further information on this grassroots educational project was that
the school was still working, attended by about 70 children.27 But whether it survives into
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the  future  or  not,  the  fact  of  its  existence in  2007,  2008 and 2009 does  represent  a
departure from the patron-client pattern. It demonstrates, in practice, the idea of citizens
getting together in ‘civil society’ to solve a problem they have in common. The problem in
this case is due to the dismal failure of the very same state that those citizens were once
prepared to trust. Their project can be interpreted as an acute emergency attempt at self-
empowerment by a local community. The outcome remains of course to be seen.
 
The wider context of power, resources and culture
69 Understanding the politics of development is, at the very least, a three-dimensional task
involving the integrated analysis, of not only power and resources, but also of cultural
norms and patterns of  behaviour.  Let  us end this  article by briefly setting our West
African example in that wider context.
70 The problem of democratisation resulting in local civil society being activated rather than
democratised is not unique to Guinea-Bissau. It has general relevance. When the local
political  process  is  focused  upon  and  reaches  into  family  and  personal  interests  of
survival and reproduction, it will very easily take the form of ‘patron-client’ relationships
rather than democratic organisation. Both citizens and leaders take advantage of the few
opportunities  available  to  them to  promote  their  short-term interests.  As  far  as  the
citizens  are  concerned,  in  situations  of  harsh  material  poverty,  this  is  principally  a
question of day-to-day survival; while for the politicians it is more a question of power
resources. As long as the citizens cannot discern any concrete reasons to assume that
public, collective, action might actually help them survive and improve their lives, the
likelihood is great that they will continue to turn to their patrons, even under the guise of
the constitutionally democratic system or through various civil society activities. This is
probably not for trusting those patrons, but for not seeing any realistic alternatives. Such
minimal democracy, thus, is likely to support political practices incapable of giving rise to
development. 
71 This looks like an impasse, at least in the short run. But in the somewhat longer run, such
negative dynamics are not likely to be sustainable. Both the development necessary for
people to survive in acceptable ways and their readiness, as well as capacity, to support
their patrons’ power is undermined. 
72 The example of Kandjadja is instructive by clearly demonstrating how little the local
people get in return for their political support. But it also suggests certain limits to their
patience. Such limits are indicated by the decline in voting support for PAIGC between
1994 and 1999, however modest in comparison to national results, and more distinctly by
the start of the new school in 2007. Still, so far, the self-perceived short-term interest of
the villagers has not incited them to new forms of politicisation, beyond participating in
multiparty elections.
73 It  is  a  common  view  in  modernisation  school  inspired  development  studies  that
particularistic political culture or codes of conduct marked by patron-client relations, as
in  Kandjadja,  and  corruption  would  somehow  causally  explain the  facts  of  unequal
resource  control  and lack  of  development  in  ‘developing  countries’,  and today  most
particularly in Africa.28 That kind of argument, however, risks coming close to tautology
or question-begging, by tending to explain political clientelism and corruption as caused
by  culture  or  codes  of  conduct  marked  by  –  clientelism  and  corruption.  The  same
argument  also  tends  to  overlook that  patron-client  relations  and corruption as  such
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certainly  have  not  prevented  economic  development  in  other  parts  of  the  world,
whether, for instance, historically in the West or in modern Asia.
74 By concentrating  –  or  appearing  to  concentrate  –  the  explanatory  effort  to  cultural
variables, the question of power in society tends to be avoided. True enough, an inherited
culture of client deference to patrons obviously supports unequal power and thus does
not facilitate democratisation. But in accordance with Max Weber’s classical sociological
perspective, culture is more fruitfully analysed as the ‘switchman’ between interest and
action than as an overall explanation of the functioning of society (cf. Rudebeck 1994,
1998).  Culture  provides  values,  images  and frameworks  for  interpreting reality.  Still,
when necessary  to  daily  survival,  even democratically  minded persons  often bow to
patrons or bosses, however reluctantly. Likewise, people whose cultural values are non-
democratic may well accept to share inherited power if necessary to their political or
perhaps even physical survival. 
75 In describing the politics of Kandjadja and its links to national politics in this text, I have
myself  made  use  of  the  concepts  of  ‘patrons’  and  ‘clients’  to  grasp  the  hierachical
structure obstructing substantial democratisation. I have not, however, designated client
deference to patrons as a Guinean cultural norm or trait, causing the village to be “left in
a hole”.This is not to say that patron/client relationships do not mark human behaviour.
They certainly do.But the decisive question on clientelism in regard to development is
about the power relations that determine clientelism rather than its existence as such, of
which we are usually well aware.29
76 In the theoretical perspective applied here, therefore, the core of the conceptual theme of
democracy and democratisation in relation to development is about material interests
and relations of  power.  Culture is  conceptualised as the Weberian ‘switchman’.  What
material  forces  or  interests  and  structures  of  power  do  actually  obstruct
democratisation ? Can they be challenged ? How do cultural norms, codes and patterns of
behaviour intervene in this ? 
77 Horizontal self-organisation from below by people with similar developmental interests –
across lines of ethnicity, gender and age – would thus be crucial to gradually breaking up
vertical patron-client structures at all levels, including the local one. However simple or
modest,  and  whether  sustainable  or  not,  the  recent  school  project  in  Kandjadja
concretises this  core issue.  Furthermore,  the project  may well  come to contribute to
cultural change in the village. Whether such change is likely or not to facilitate self-
empowerment and substantial democratisation as referred to in the introductory part of
this article, will in turn depend on the kind of teaching provided in the school.
78 This may seem like a tiny conclusion for a study aiming to grasp such a lofty abstraction
as  ‘substantial  democracy’.  Though  possibly  tiny  in  a  quantitative  sense,  it  does
nevertheless hold a grain of – substance.
 
Tables referred to in the text
 
Table 1. Comparison of national assembly election results in Kandjadja and the country as a whole,
28 November 1999 and 28 March 2004 (results rounded to the nearest percentage point)
 Kandjadja Whole country
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 2004 1999 2004 1999
PAIGC 40 67 15 31
Other parties 42 29 68 62
Blank + invalid 18 4 17 7
Total percentages 100 100 100 100
Sources : The Kandjadja percentages are based on ﬁgures noted by the local voting ofﬁcial, ﬁlled in by
the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja on the basis of the voting ofﬁcial’s own
information received directly from the polling station, 28 and 29.11.1999 (Kandjadja, 1999 national
assembly election), and 28.3.2004 (Kandjadja, 2004 national assembly election). The 1999 ﬁgures for
Kandjadja were furthermore checked against hand-written material from the deputy elected in 1999
for PAIGC in constituency no. 7, Mansabá, to which Kandjadja belongs (Mansabá sector, constituency
no. 7, 1999). The 1999 national level percentages are based on ﬁgures published by Comissão Nacional
de Eleições, Bissau, 9.12.1999 and 25.1.2000. The 2004 national level percentages are based on
ﬁgures published by Nô Pintcha, 8.4.2004 and Lusa, 4.4.2004. 
 
Table 2. Results of national assembly elections in Kandjadja, 28 November 1999 and 28 March
2004, total number of votes and rounded-off percentages
 Number of votes
   
 1999 2004 %1999 %2004
PAIGC 172 257 40 68
UNDP 34 13 8 3 (3.4)
PRS 30 38 7 10
RGB 30 3 7 1 (0.8)
UM 23 12 5 3 (3.2)
PSD 19  4  
AD 16  4  
LIPE 14  3  
FDS 10  2  
FLING 4  1  
PRP 2  1 (0.5)  
PUSD  15
 4
APU  9
 2 (2.4)
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Frente para a Dem.  6
 2 (1.6)
PU  4
 1 (1.1)
PDS  3
 1 (0.8)
PUN  2
 1 (0.5)
UE  1
 0 (0.3)
blank + invalid 78  18  
blank  15
 4
Total 432 378 100 100
Sources : The ﬁgures for 1999 (Kandjadja, 1999 national assembly election) were noted by the local
voting ofﬁcial and then ﬁlled in by the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja in a copy of
the original form, on the basis of the voting ofﬁcial’s own information received directly from the polling
station, 28 and 29.11.1999. I also checked these data against hand-written material shown to me by
the deputy elected in 1999 for PAIGC (Mansabá sector, constituency n° 7, 1999). The ﬁgures for 2004
were given to me directly by the chairman of the section committee on the occasion of my visit on 29
June 2007 (Kandjadja, 2004 national assembly election). The ﬁgures for total number of votes cast
(381) do not quite match the sum arrived at (378) when the separate posts are added. I decided to put
the latter ﬁgure in the table. There is also a small uncertainty in regard to PUSD, which appears twice
in the data (2+13=15 = the ﬁgure found in the table). “Frente para a Democracía” is not found in the
ofﬁcial statistics. It may refer to FDS (Frente Democrática Social). These minor inconsistencies and
uncertainties do not in any way affect the credibility and validity of the data.
 
Table 3. Results of the first round of presidential election in Kandjadja, 28 November 1999, number
of votes and rounded-off percentages
 Number of votes % of total 
Kumba Yalá (PRS) 34 8
Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) 313 72
Faustino Fudut Imbali (independent) 3 1 (0.7)
Fernando Gomes (independent) 2 0 (0.46)
João Tatis Sá (independent) – –
Abubacar Baldé (UNDP) 12 3
Bubacar Rachid Djaló (LIPE) 4 1 (0.9)
Joaquim Baldé (PSD) 1 0 (0.2)    
Salvador Tchongo (independent) 3 1 (0.7)
José Catengul Mendes (FLING) 2 0 (0.46)
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Mamadú Uri Baldé (PRP) – –
Antonieta Rosa Gomes (FCG/SD) 1 1 (0.7)
blank 23 5
invalid 29 7
protested 9 2
Total votes 436 100
abstained 38 8 (of 474))
Total registered votes 474 8 % (of 474)
Sources : The ﬁgures for 1999 (Kandjadja, 1999 presidential election, ﬁrst round) were noted by the
local voting ofﬁcial and then ﬁlled in by the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja in a copy
of the original form, on the basis of the voting ofﬁcial’s own information received directly from the
polling station, 28 and 29.11.1999. I also checked them against hand-written material shown to me by
the deputy elected in 1999 for PAIGC (Mansabá sector, constituency n°. 7, 1999). There were a few very
minor inconsistencies between the two sets of data, in no way affecting their credibility and validity.
The table is based on the local voting ofﬁcial’s ﬁgures.
 
Table 4. Results of the second rounds of presidential elections in Kandjadja, 16 January 2000 and
24 July 2005, number of votes and rounded-off percentages 
 Number of votes
 
 2000 2005 %2000 %2005
Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) 352 423 86 93
Kumba Yalá (PRS) 39  10  
‘Nino’ Vieira (independent)  33
 7
Blank votes 18 * 4 *
Invalid votes 1 * 0 (0.2) *
Total votes cast 410 * 100 *
79 * Information not available on blank and invalid votes and thus not on “total votes cast”
for  the  2005 election in  Kandjadja.  Thus,  the  percentages  in  the  table  are  not  quite
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comparable between the two years. Calculated on the basis of “votes for candidates”, as
for 2005, Malam Bacai Sanhá got 90 percent in 2000. 
Sources : The ﬁgures for 2000 are based on hand-written records shown to me by the deputy elected
for PAIGC in 1999 (Mansabá sector, constituency n°. 7, 2000). This was based in turn on information
received on election-day by the PAIGC parliamentarian directly from the 51 polling stations. The
polling stations were under the supervision of the PAIGC supervisor for the whole constituency, who
was also the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja. The ﬁgures for 2005 were given to me
in Bissau on 30.6.2007 by mobile phone from the village by the chairman of the section committee for
Kandjadja (Kandjadja, 24.7.2005 presidential election, second round). 
 
Table 5. Comparison between Kandjadja and the country as a whole, second rounds of presidential
elections in Kandjadja, 16 January 2000 and 24 July 2005, rounded-off percentages of votes for the
two remaining candidates
 % 2000 % 2005
 Kandjadja Whole country Kandjadja Whole country
Malam Bacai Sanhá 90 27 93 47
Kumba Yalá 10 69   
‘Nino’ Vieira  
 7 51
Sources : For Kandjadja, same as table 4 ; for whole country 2000, Comissão Nacional de Eleições,
2000a ; for whole country 2005, Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 2005. 
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145 UM, União para a Mudança/Union for Change
146 UNDP, União Nacional para o Desenvolvimento e Progresso/National Union
for Development and Progress
147 UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
NOTES
1.  This  is  a  new version  bringing  in  additional  material  and  observations,  as  well  as  being
marked by the author’s continuous reflection on the issues under consideration. 
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2.  For  the  conceptual  framework  employed,  see  my  previous  work  on  democracy,
democratisation and development (e.g. Rudebeck 2002a ; 2003, 2008), with references. Using the
term  “substantial”  for  a  non-minimalistic  and  two-dimensional  view  of  democracy  is  by
inspiration from OlleTörnquist : “Substantial democracy ‘only’ means that the conventional rules
of the game... are both fair and applied in vital sectors of society...” (2002 :29). 
3.  The argument is in line for instance with Törnquist’s  theoretical  analysis of post-tsunami
development  and democratisation in  the  autonomous  province  of  Aceh in  Indonesia.  Recent
developments in Aceh lead Törnquist to suggest (2009 :1) : “Peace and development in Aceh is
due to more, not less, democracy.”
4.  The writing of this article had largely been concluded by early November 2008, at the very
moment Guinea-Bissau was entering a period of acute political violence and instability. For the
sake of completeness, the dramatic key events of the period until early August 2009 have been
added to the background description. Empirically these events serve furthermore to support the
analytical argument of the article.
5.  The 2003 putsch and subsequent developments were given good coverage by Lusa.
6.  For facts and analyses, see Lusa’s continuous and detailed reporting.
7.  At the moment of writing these lines in early August 2009.
8.  In December 2007, for instance, the Minister of Finance presented a budget in the National
Assembly which added up to a deficit of 60 per cent. His comment was that the deficit “would
easily be overcome with the approval of the Post-Conflict programme about to be negotiated
with the International Monetary Fund and a subsequent donor conference” (Lusa, 6.12.2007).
9.  In Guinea-Bissau the name of the village is usually spelt Candjadja, which is the Portuguese
spelling. When transcribing from Mandinga, however, which is the predominant language in the
area, as well as when writing in Guinean Creole, it is common to use the letter K for the k-sound. I
therefore continue to use the K, as I have always done, although this is not the official usage.
10.  The  villages  in  the  section  are  (with  official  spelling):  Candjadja,  Dabocunda,  Corinto,
Sabalacunda,  Ninjobaia,  Colissari,  Mandina, Breco-ba,  Breco-rim,  Salinto,  Madina  Saladala,
Tambato, and Djebacunda.
11.  The point of departure for my population estimate is the number of persons entitled to vote
and thus over 18 in the section in 1999, which was 2,209 voters, according to a local count made
in 1999 (Mansabá, sector, constituency n°. 7, 2000). I have then extrapolated from the proportion
over 20 +  1/10 of  those under 20 years found in the whole country according to population
estimates by a group of Guinean social scientists (Imbali et al. 1995). My figure is thus based on
the assumption that the age distribution is the same in Kandjadja as in the whole country. If so
(and if Imbali et al. are right), then the population of the thirteen villages of the section would
have been 4,536 inhabitants in September 1999, which is not unlikely.
12.  Just after the civil war, the large family I know best told me that, from time to time, they had
had up to thirty different relatives staying with them as refugees in their simple houses. Now
their supplies had been emptied, including the seed for sowing the following year.
13.  I  have  described  this  in  some  detail,  including  the  far-reaching  effects  of  economic
liberalisation  and  structural  adjustment,  in  earlier  writings  (see  Rudebeck  1992,  with  full
references to even earlier writings). I have also noted the lack of any change during the 1990s
(2001 :72 ff.)
14.  59 per cent of the Kandjadja voters still supported PAIGC in 1994 as opposed to 38 per cent in
the whole country (Rudebeck 2001 :77). 
15.  See Rudebeck 1992, in particular pp. 269-270, with full references to earlier works.
16.  The homem grande of Kandjadja village took over more or less formally as the chairman of the
section until his death in 1992. His son coninued in the same function which, however, seems to
have become more and more nominal, except in connection with elections when he, as we shall
see, continued to be very much in charge at the local level. 
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17.  In the section there were five other polling stations besides the one in Kandjadja (which
included Kandjadja-Balanta),  namely in the villages of Mandina,  Djebacunda,  Corinto,  Madina
Saladala and Salinto.
18.  Interviews on 4 and 11.12.1999. During the latter interview the chairman carefully consulted
the notes he had made on election day.
19.  Guinea-Bissau’s  various  political  parties  will  not  be  presented  here.  See  my  book  On
Democracy’s Sustainability (Rudebeck 2001 :42-56) for a detailed such presentation. The following
summarising characteristic is just as valid in 2008 as it was around 2000 : “It is not possible to
distinguish between the political parties in Guinea-Bissau by studying their party programmes.
The slogans of all the parties are almost identical... all the parties claim to stand for democracy,
justice  and  human  rights,  as  well  as  a  market  economy  that  is  socially  accountable...  Any
discernible differences tended to concern social and cultural/ethnic roots, financing, historical
ties between leaders and supporters, and the personal qualities of the leaders” (2001 :42.) The full
names of the parties are found in the list of abbreviations at the end of this article.
20.  Resulting in 45 out of 100 seats for PAIGC in parliament, enough to form a national majority
coalition, given the system of distributing seats between the parties applied in Guinea-Bissau (the
so-called d’Hondt system) which favours the largest party.
21.  See Rudebeck (1997 :38-44), on positive recognition in the village of greater civic freedom
coupled with disillusionment over powerlesness in regard to development. 
22.  For the 1994 presidential election in Kandjadja, I only have exact data on the second round.
In that round ‘Nino’ scored 90 per cent in the village as compared with 49 in the country as a
whole (Rudebeck 1997 :31, 25).
23.  The theoretical and theoretically inspired literature on civil society, democratisation and
development is huge. This is not the place to enter into it. For a useful introduction see Törnquist
1999.  For an instructive survey of  the history of  the concept  see Sjögren 2001.  For  a  recent
comment by myself on the closely related discourse on ‘civic trust’ see Rudebeck (2007 :17-18). I
point out there that trust between citizens is often assumed to reign high in ‘civil society’, which
clearly could be positive for democracy – when or if it happens and, if so, depending on how. It is
a  significant  research  task  to  study  the  if,  when and  how of  that  possibility.  Neither  the
correlation itself nor its democratising implications can be taken for granted.
24.  RADI is an African NGO for culture-based development work in agriculture. The countries
that  are  represented  through  their  national  organisations  are  Burkina  Faso,  Central  African
Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Congo. (RADI, no date;
Hellström  1995 :36-37).  Another  document  (RADI  1995)  provides  information  on  RADI’s
organisational structure in the Oio region. The Guinea-Bissau branch of RADI relies on funding by
SWISSAID, a Swiss NGO.
25.  Translated from the French language original by Lars Rudebeck.
26.  On the occasion of my visit, the teacher was on summer vacation.
27.  Information received in Uppsala by mobile phone call  from the chairman of  the section
committee in Kandjadja, 26 October 2008, confirmed in another call in mid-June 2009.
28.  To illustrate, Leys 1996 offers a critical analysis of such development studies, while Chabal &
Daloz 1999 navigate close to it in their analyses. In an essay on ‘modernisation thinking’ found in
a  contribution  to  a  volume  on  the  theoretical  heritage  of  Marx  and  Weber  in  development
studies, I have myself attempted a critical deconstruction (Rudebeck 1994).
29.  Cf.the following incisive remark by Mamdani (1996 :295 note 2) on “the mode of domination”
as an explanatory variable: “My point about clientelism is that it is more an effect of the form of
power than an explanation of it”.
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RÉSUMÉS
Une  distinction  conceptuelle  est  introduite  entre  démocratie  minimale  et  démocratie
substantielle.  Le  dernier  concept  intègre  une  démocratie  minimaliste  constitutionnellement
définie,  et  une  notion  d’égalité  politique  dans  la  pratique.  Selon  cette  perspective,  la
‘democratisation substantielle’ et le ‘développement’ sont liés. L’argument est illustré avec une
étude  de  cas  diachronique  d’un  village  au  nord  de  la  Guinée-Bissau.  Pour  le  village,  la
démocratisation minimale manifestée à travers des élections multi-partistes depuis le début des
années 90 n’a abouti ni à la démocratie substantielle, ni au développement. Il y a néanmoins des
limites  à  la  patience des  villageois,  car  en 2006 l’école  du village,  fermée depuis  1989,  a  été
rouverte par les parents d’élèves. Cette initiative pourrait, en effet, être vue comme une tentative
de prise de pouvoir (empowerment) par une communauté locale en quête de développement.
Durable ou non, cette initiative concrétise la question-clé de l’organisation horizontale par le bas.
A conceptual distinction is made between minimal and substantial democracy, where the latter
concept aims to integrate constitutional minimalistically defined democracy with a notion of
political  equality  in  actual  practice.  In  this  perspective,  ‘substantial  democratisation’  and
‘development’ are linked to each other. The argument is illustrated through a diachronic case
study of a village in Northern Guinea-Bissau. Minimal democratisation through national multi-
party elections since the early 1990s has resulted neither in substantial democratization, nor in
development in the village. Some limit to people’s patience is indicated by the opening in 2006 of
a primary school in the village, run by the parents to substitute for the public school which
closed in 1989. The initiative can be seen as an emergency attempt at self-empowerment by a
local community in dire need of development. Whether sustainable or not, it concretises the core
issue of horizontal self-organisation from below.
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